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Chapter 10 
The Door in the Middle: Six Conditions for Anthropology 
João de Pina-Cabral 
 
Some of the best minds in anthropological theory over the past decades have been 
warning us that modernist anthropological theory has come to a serious impasse.1 Modern 
anthropological theory comprises the conceptual frameworks that emerged in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, reaching its peak in the 1930s and 1940s, and then 
entered into a process of critical self-questioning around and after the 1960s. Fifty years after 
the optimistic formulations of Parsons, Kroeber, Fortes and Gluckman, the central concepts that 
laid the ground for the development of our discipline are viewed with suspicion by most 
anthropologists today.  In this paper, I argue that we can neither deny the value of the critique 
nor resign ourselves to the air of gloom that results from it.  I suggest some ways out of the 
impasse.  
‘Is the concept of society theoretically obsolete?’ One might lean towards either side of 
the famous Manchester debate,2 but one has to acknowledge that it makes sense to ask the 
question.  Similarly with the concept of culture. Having examined its history, Adam Kuper 
concludes that ‘it is a poor strategy to separate out a cultural sphere, and to treat it in its own 
terms’ (Kuper 1999b: 247).3 In a related vein, Marilyn Strathern (1992a, 1992b, 1999), 
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2002b) and Roy Wagner (1981) argue that the modernist 
theoretical mould depends on three essential sets of polarities that can no longer constitute 
pillars of our thinking. But they have also shown how those polarities have surreptitiously 
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survived in the categories we continue to use and in our modes of acting as anthropologists. 
These are, to use Viveiros de Castro’s summary: primitive versus civilised; individual versus 
society; and nature versus culture.4 In his history of the concept of the ‘primitive’, Adam Kuper 
(1988) laid out the historical ground for such a realization. 
Despite being very much alive, relevant and active as an empirical discipline, 
anthropology has for too long been theoretically gagged in relation to the other social sciences, 
sociology in particular (cf. Pina-Cabral 2005a).  Although our research areas expand and we are 
making significant contributions to the understanding of the central problems facing our 
contemporary world – such as AIDS, journalism, homelessness, terrorism, to name just a few 
(see Bastos 1999; Hannerz 2004; Passaro 1996; Donahue 2007) – our capacity to intervene 
theoretically has been diminished by our persistent attachment to formulas of disciplinary 
definition that are no longer scientifically defensible (cf. Pina-Cabral 2006).  
It has been argued that the problem lies in the very nature of these pillars, in that, as with 
all modernist thinking, they have written into them a utopian disposition. Modernist thought 
was driven by what we might call expectation concepts (cf. Bolle 2004: 273, see also Latour 
1993). The dynamism of such notions lies in that they describe by reference not to what is (or 
was) but by reference to an expected future. Thus, the opposition primitive/civilised assumes 
the eventual victory of civilization; the opposition between individual and society assumes both 
the eventual victory of the individual (as Mauss and Durkheim clearly stated) and the future 
coming of a fuller condition of sociality (as Marx predicted); finally, the nature/culture 
opposition assumes the victory of culture and science over nature. 
 
Dystopian Modernism 
If we remain bound by such expectation concepts, even though we may well lose faith in the 
future, we still have not freed ourselves from the framework they imply. We move from a 
utopian posture to a dystopian posture, but we are still in the shackles of a futuristic expectation. 
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Over the past ten years, anthropology has given signs of this type of gloom (Pina-Cabral 2007b). 
Many adopted deflationist attitudes, giving up on or being agnostic about the possibility of 
knowledge of the real; many accepted discursivist descriptions of socio-cultural life, slipping 
into a rhetorical game of liberated meanings; many continued to call themselves social 
scientists but abstained from knowing what science is, and some even raised the possibility of 
there being alternative anthropologies and alternative sciences. Some gave up on generalisation 
grounded in ethnographic observation. Finally, some entertained the notion that there may be 
no such thing as a ‘human condition’. 
Such attitudes are essentially negative. Instead of opening up new paths of empirical 
and theoretical exploration, they remain trapped within the terms set by the modernist 
oppositions which caused our initial dissatisfaction. They are the posturings of those who, faced 
with the discovery that the expected future has not materialised, have despaired of the future 
overall. This, however, is not a tenable position. It makes more sense to follow the lead of 
Adam Kuper (1988, 2005; see also Mintz 1994: 290) and question the bases of the ‘primitivist’ 
hypothesis that supported the scientific project of twentieth-century anthropology. 
In order to do so, however, we also have to query some of the central presuppositions 
that underpinned it – most particularly the metaphysics of group-ness that accompanies the 
utopian disposition: that is, sociocentrism. The term – coined by Durkheim and Mauss in the 
last pages of their essay on primitive classification (Durkheim and Mauss 1963) – points to 
some of the sets of oppositions mentioned above. It reveals three tendencies: firstly, to treat 
social entities as unitary and self-defined (individual/society); secondly, to approach modernity 
as a uniquely creative move (primitive/civilized); and thirdly, to reify ideas as representations 
outside the world (nature/culture). 
The problems we face today are largely derived from our unwillingness to shed the 
utopian dispositions we inherited from the early modernists. This applies not only to the 
anthropological theory that we produce, but also to how we produce it. In an insatiable search 
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for yet another ‘master’ thinker who will take us to a higher level of theory, we continue to 
search for yet another paradigmatic shift that will free us from the perplexities of the past.5 But 
this is a quest for a mirage. As Adam Kuper has shown, we cannot afford to cut loose from our 
anthropological heritage, but we should not remain bound to those aspects of it that cause us 
problems (Kuper 1988, 2005). There is no contradiction in looking for ‘a door in the middle’: 
that is, in giving up on radical breaks and searching for humbler solutions that will allow us to 
practise anthropology and ethnography in new ways whilst building on our distinguished 
heritage. The six conditions that I outline below are not seen as definitive answers to old 
quandaries, but as paths out of this dystopia. 
 
Realism 
The real is neither at the point of arrival nor at the point of exit: it poses itself for us, rather, 
midways. 
—João Guimarães Rosa, Grande Sertão: Veredas (2001) 
 
It is important to continue to hold that, in ethnography, we can capture the real. Ultimate truth 
will always evade us but lesser truths – which, over time, accumulate – do not. Empirical 
research is a complex and exacting task. But the difficulties in undertaking it are worth 
overcoming because the knowledge that results from it proves to be more resilient and less 
prone to observational disagreement than our everyday knowledge of our surrounding world.  
Despite many circumstances which mediate such knowledge, the ultimate value of empirical 
observation and theoretical rationalisation cannot be denied.  
We must learn how to distinguish epistemological relativism from methodological 
relativism, since, whilst the former is a dead end for our discipline, the later is its basic 
trademark. Anthropologists have often been tempted to conclude from the fact that the lived 
world is historically constituted, that the constituting process is all there is; that is, that there is 
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no world. Some claim, emphatically, that since anthropology is a Western system of knowledge 
it cannot presume to be better or more embracing than the local knowledge systems it studies. 
According to this view, any claim of scientific status or of a form of progressive accumulation 
of knowledge based on the maximization of rational enquiry is taken to be demeaning of the 
people anthropologists study and thus morally suspect.  
This argument assumes that to favour a scientific approach is to make claims to its being 
morally superior to everyday means of knowing the world. In other words, it assumes in 
modernist fashion, firstly, that everyday life can be lived according to science, and secondly, 
that such a life would be somehow morally superior. If these assumptions were valid, then the 
peoples being represented in our studies would be entitled to complain about the scientific 
status of ethnography and anthropology. They are, however, unfounded. Further, it is 
anthropologists rather than the people they want to represent who are despondent about modern 
science. Such a stance represents an incapacity to distance oneself from the expectation 
concepts concerning primitivism and individualism. It also means a continued embracing of 
modernist sociocentrism. 
 Moreover, the posture presumes a moral obligation to represent the people studied. The 
anthropologist speaks for ‘their’ people. Thus, sociocentrism meets paternalism in a narcissistic 
discourse which ultimately privileges the ethnographer over their informants. If anthropology 
were ‘Western’ and I were ‘Western’, then it would not be morally suspect for me to prefer ‘my 
own’ discourse over that of another.6 But the wider world in which anthropologists are situated 
is far more complex than their local everyday context. Their participation in a global ecumene7 
brings with it an obligation to respect the views of others. Anthropology is not ‘Western’; it is 
an intrinsic part of that global ecumene that is the reason for anthropologists’ sense of 
responsibility to respect the ideas of others.  
 In a postcolonial setting, the practice of ethnography has altered fundamentally. This is 
so, not only because ethnography and anthropology are now routinely practised by people 
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whose identification as Western is doubtful, but also because the people anthropologists study 
have found new ways of negotiating the knowledge anthropologists produce (Ramos 1998). 
The paternalistic assumption that the anthropologist’s methodological mandate to respect the 
people they study extends to a right to represent ‘their people’ (a collective constituted out of 
ethnographic practice) is highly suspect. The world where ethnography is practised today is one 
where the ethnographer is likely to encounter anthropologically trained ‘natives’. A new 
condition of mutuality is, thus, inscribed into the ethnographic encounter that makes for a far 
more complex political engagement of the ethnographer in his or her field. 
Deflationism (the belief that truth is not a valid category) is thus something to be 
avoided if we want to pursue our activities as anthropologists and ethnographers. In 
anthropology, Kuper warns, relativism goes hand-in-hand with a form of implicit idealism 
(Kuper 1999b: 19). To question the possibility of access to truth – or to pluralise truth – is to 
retreat into the realm of pure ideas. Whilst this might appear to liberate one from the pitfalls of 
ethnocentric interpretation, by opening the way to a plurality of perspectival approaches, it 
actually reconstructs the problems of sociocentrism by reifying the groups or peoples that are 
supposed to hold such views.  
The move to idealism, and the retreat to the realm of ideas, eats away at the possibility 
of anthropological knowledge. If we want anthropology to be possible and ethnography to 
thrive, we should avoid such forms of dystopian depression. But this does not mean that we 
should engage in blind positivism. Some of the recent attempts to revive robust types of 
scientistic realism are just as much acts of despair as culturalist deflationism. As contemporary 
philosophers have shown, we do better to steer towards the ‘door in the middle’; that is, some 
form of minimal realism that will allow us to operate methodological relativism whilst avoiding 
epistemological relativism (see Lynch 1998).   
 
Limited Interest 
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Ethnography and anthropology are not and have never been a discourse on the native’s 
discourses (see Viveiros de Castro 2002a). As was stressed by earlier anthropologists, neither 
society nor culture offered themselves ready-made for the anthropologist to describe. Rather, 
anthropologists had and still have to construct their object from observations of everyday, 
taken-for-granted events, many or most of which are not discursive in the sense of being 
planned acts of communication. And because events are constitutive processes, acts of 
communication and social categories of action (persons, groups, and so on) are profoundly 
intermeshed in historically complex ways.  
 Two central aspects mediate our ability to observe and describe human lives as they are 
lived: firstly,  the play of intersubjective relations, both as they operate in the production of 
local meanings and vis-à-vis the ethnographer; and secondly,  events in the surrounding or 
environing world whose parameters may remain implicit (Davidson 2004). These inform what 
ethnographers can understand of the human setting in which they find themselves, including 
those explicitly formulated events in terms of which they interpret locally recurrent forms of 
historically constituted engagement. Moreover, understanding intersubjectivity necessarily 
entails an analysis of its political, economic and other dimensions; that is to say, an analysis that 
reveals the constituting forms taken by social relations in any given case. 
Analysing the play of intersubjectivity in the environing world provides for a more 
thorough and subtle understanding of domination, for example, than is available by means of 
discourse analysis. The idea of discourse, in Foucauldian or Deleuzean terms, of course 
includes power (cf. Lutz and Abu-Lugod 1990; Viveiros de Castro 2007). But all discursivism 
ultimately implies a dystopic denial that the world outside of human sociation impinges on 
human sociation and that our shared or surrounding world is also part of our ethnographies. The 
very acts of practising and of writing ethnography would be impossible without decisive 
attention both to this environing world and to the way in which earlier acts of communication 
have been reified in each particular setting. It is essential to recognise the complex process of 
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triangulation which occurs between the interpreter, their human others, and the surrounding 
world. Mintz gives an example of this relationship when he observes that: 
 
a profound difference between the history of our discipline in Europe, on the one hand, 
and in the Western Hemisphere on the other, inheres in the simple fact that our 
[American] subjects of study, our ‘primitive’ peoples, were our neighbours – our 
ill-treated, indeed often persecuted, neighbours. In this instance as in others, the 
anthropology we do and have done is conditioned by the history and social complexion 
of the society whence we come (Mintz 1994: 290).   
Triangulation occurs at all levels: the ethnographic encounter is shaped by it at both ends.  It is 
shaped, on the one hand, by the local, historically informed relations of triangulation and, on the 
other, by the complex process of historical constitution of disciplinary agendas.  As Davidson 
put it, ‘relativism about standards requires what there cannot be, a position beyond all 
standards’ (Davidson 2005: 181). 
 Like all human action, anthropology is interested, in the sense that it is engaged in the 
world; it has implicit within it an investment on the part of the agent (personal or collective).  
Bourdieu, in his treatment of the notion of habitus (Bourdieu 1980), shows that the border 
between conscious and unconscious interest is of little heuristic use when studying human 
action (see also Davidson 2005: 286–7; Pina-Cabral 2007b).  
 Interest is related to motivation which, in turn, is defined by two central parameters: on 
the one hand, the categories of identity that inform an agent’s motivational perceptions and, on 
the other, the intersubjectively produced categories that characterise the field of action.  The 
central value of the notion of interest is that it allows us to understand social action as a constant 
negotiation of the future and the past in intersubjective terms.  The issue of simultaneity, to be 
discussed later, is relevant inasmuch as it limits the directedness of interest.  No person bears 
only one identity.  Diverse forms of investment in the world combine in any particular social 
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action; interests limit each other and compound one another, way beyond the capacity of 
unilinear or single-minded intention (whether this be individual or collective).  The concept of 
interest, then, is only useful to the extent that it is seen as limited.  It is possible to investigate 
the limits of interest in any specific case of human action, thus gaining some insight into the 
complex process of triangulation that characterises it (see Pina-Cabral and Bestard Camps 
2003). That, too, is a door in the middle. 
 
Meaning 
The proclivities of sociocentrism to treat both social entities as self-enclosed units and 
categories or ideas as things (as actual pictures in the mind) appear to be independent of each 
other.  They are, however, determined by the same modernist need to separate subject from 
object, action from thought, fact from value (cf. de Coppet 1992: 70).  The fact that the two 
tendencies appear mutually independent merely contributes to their mutual validation.  This is 
argued cogently by de Coppet in his historical account of the evolution of the concept of 
representation.  It is difficult to follow him to his ultimate conclusions, however, because of his 
continued attachment to a hard concept of ‘society/system’. This runs counter to my present 
argument: that modernist sociocentrism is best eradicated from the study of what it is to be 
human.  The critique of such a notion of society does not, contra de Coppet (ibid.: 70), 
necessarily imply a retreat into individualism.  It is erroneous to attribute a separate ontology to 
personhood and to collectivities (societies, cultures, groups, systems), since to do so is to 
reproduce the metaphysics of group-ness that characterised the thought of Comte, Durkheim 
and their followers, one of the greatest hurdles that social anthropology has met with 
throughout the twentieth century. 
To overcome this hurdle it is necessary not only to transcend the dichotomy which 
counterposes individuality and group-ness. Existing ideas about meaning also need to be 
interrogated.  Anthropologists have been working for too long with a semiotic theory of 
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representation that is arguably dependent on an ‘essentially incoherent picture of the mind’ 
(Davidson 2001: 52).  More sophisticated theories of meaning are required, which emphasise 
both the socially relational aspect and the fact that meaning is dependent on practical 
experience.  Giddens points to anthropologists’ implicit adoption of a theory of meaning that is 
epistemologically unsound: ‘those who speak of a crisis of representation in anthropology, or 
who see anthropological work merely as a species of creative fiction, are the victims of a false 
theory of meaning’.  He traces the origin of this to the structural linguistics of Saussure and the 
way in which ‘meaning is understood [there] in relation to a play of signifiers, not – as it should 
be – in the context of practical experience’ (Giddens 1996: 124–5).8  
This ‘picture of the mind’, as Davidson calls it, has become so deeply engrained in our 
philosophical heritage9 that we find it almost impossible to escape its grip, even when its 
noxious effects become apparent. 
 
In one crude, but familiar, version it goes like this: the mind is a theatre in which the 
conscious self watches a passing show (the shadows on the wall).  The show consists of 
‘appearances’, sense data, qualia, what is ‘given’ in experience.  What appear on the 
stage are not the ordinary objects in the world that the outer eye registers and the heart 
loves, but their purported representations.  Whatever we know about the world outside 
depends on what we can glean from the inner clues. (Davidson 2001: 34) 
 
Contrary to this, Davidson argues, we have no use for the notion of ‘purely private, subjective 
“objects of the mind”.… Beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing.  It is good to be rid 
of representations, and with them the correspondence theory of truth, for it is thinking there are 
representations that engenders intimations of relativism’ (ibid.: 46).   
To reject such a theory of meaning does not mean that we must reject the need to 
understand the processes of semantic integration that constitute the favoured paths in our 
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universe of beliefs.  These, ultimately, are what the ethnographer searches to identify 
(Pina-Cabral 2004).  The ethnographer’s method is essentially to make sense of what others are 
doing and saying in terms of an assumption of essential human similarity and a world that is 
common at once to self and other. And here we return to the notion of triangulation: 
We are bound to suppose someone we want to understand inhabits our world of 
macroscopic, more or less enduring physical objects with familiar causal dispositions; 
that his world, like ours, contains people with minds and motives; and that he shares 
with us the desire to find warmth, love, security, and success, and the desire to avoid 
pain and distress.… [U]nless we can interpret others as sharing a vast amount of what 
makes up our common sense we will not be able to identify any of their beliefs and 
desires and intentions, any of their propositional attitudes. (ibid.: 183). 
 
This passage deserves the attention of anthropologists, since few have chosen to give 
attention to the simplest processes that make for the possibility of their favoured form of 
empirical knowledge – ethnography.  By these means, rather than taking for granted the 
possibility of simple human communication in the face of interpretative indeterminacy, many 
might have avoided the destructive and deeply unsettling slide from methodological relativism 
to epistemological relativism that has so troubled the discipline since the 1960s. 
To this must be added something that is implicit in the passage of Mintz’s quoted earlier: 
ethnographers do not work in a private individual setting.  They are never alone with their 
subjects of study except if and when they choose to discard their professional robes.  
Ethnography and anthropology are processes within a collective pursuit with a collective past 
and a presumed collective future.  And that is not ‘the history of the West’, whatever that might 
mean.  Rather, it is the complex and ongoing history of the constitution of a global ecumene that 
is increasingly becoming available to all.   
Such a global ecumene is, of course, structured by shifting relations of domination 
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because the process of making meaning always implicates the form of relations it engages. But 
there is no point in despairing of this.  On the contrary, we must take the fact that our own 
scientific activity is immersed in human history as the very starting point of our efforts to know 
more and better. As Merleau-Ponty pointed out: 
 
Since we are all hemmed in by history, it is up to us to understand that whatever truth we 
may have is to be gotten not in spite of but through our historical inherence.  
Superficially considered, our inherence destroys all truth. As long as I cling to the ideal 
of an ideal spectator, of knowledge with no point of view, I can see my situation as 
nothing but a source of error.  But if I have once recognized that through it I am grafted 
into every action and all knowledge which can have a meaning for me, and that step by 
step it contains everything which can exist for me, then my contact with the social in the 
finitude of my situation is revealed to me as the point of origin of all truth, including 
scientific truth. (Merlau-Ponty 1964: 109) 
 
Here, too, is a door in the middle that allows us to avoid both the utopian and the dystopian 
fantasies of completeness. 
 
Freedom and Necessity 
‘Human sciences’, claims Fernando Gil, ‘have taken on the task of resolving the paroxysmal 
antinomy of Kantian freedom and necessity’ (Gil 2004: 11). He defines ‘necessity’ by reference 
to determination: that is, in Aristotelian terms, the condition that something comes next unless 
something else prevents it from doing so.  Curiously, anthropologists in the twentieth century 
have avoided this antinomy – perhaps because of the theoretical paroxysm it implies.   
Freedom of the will has played a very small role in anthropological theorizing, despite 
having permeated all good ethnography.  The few exceptions can be seen in those writings 
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where anthropologists talk about the actual people from whose behaviour they try to abstract; 
for example, through situational analysis (e.g., Van Velsen 1964) or methodological debate 
(e.g., Casagrande 1960).  The notion of determination is, however, either taken for granted in 
generic terms or too easily derided.  In anthropological literature, necessity in human behaviour 
is most often linked to Malinowski’s theoretical blunders concerning ‘needs’. This word has a 
bad name in anthropological theory, being used most often as a blanket term in order to iron out 
some logically unsatisfactory theoretical jump.  
When Boon and Schneider, for example, justify their culturalist reading of 
Lévi-Strauss’s oeuvre by trashing the notion of ‘the hypothetical “social needs” of the group’ 
(Boon and Schneider 1974: 807), they close off important doors to interdisciplinary debate 
concerning relative human determination. Worse still, they manage to sidestep the issue of the 
freedom of the will, ignoring the fact that one cannot be considered without the other.  Cultural 
determinism comes to be hidden beneath a thin veneer of liberal goodwill. They try to clean up 
Lévi-Strauss’s arguments about the atom of kinship by transposing these to culture – which 
they understand in purely semiotic terms as the realm of ‘ideas.’  They complain that, as a 
response to his British critics, Lévi-Strauss has (correctly, they argue) ‘shifted his kinship 
models to their proper cultural level’ but (unfortunately, in their view) he ‘left the vestigial 
social cohesion arguments’ (ibid.: 816, my emphasis) in The Elementary Structures of Kinship 
(Lévi-Strauss 1969).   
Contrary to Boon and Schneider, however, such an option would not have resolved the 
problem of the ultimate social import of kinship. It would continue to be necessary – ultimately 
– to talk of ‘groups’ and ‘units’, as indeed they do: ‘Societies do not have patrilateral or 
matrilateral systems; rather groups or parts of groups reveal ideas of such marriages which 
might be carried out to various extents’ (Boon and Schneider 1974: 810).  Thus, their culturalist 
reduction to ideas only succeeds in delaying, postponing or obscuring the inevitable talk of 
group-ness – raising the far more problematic notion of knowing what exactly is an idea as held 
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by a group.   
This is a problem with all culturalist anthropology, as is apparent, for example, in 
Ortner’s most recent attempts to integrate power and practice into culture (Ortner 2006).  Her 
efforts are genuine and valuable but they remain constrained by the fact that, concerning culture, 
no dependence on ideas is possible that does not ultimately postulate the group that holds them.  
Talk of material ‘needs’ is avoided, but cultural determination rules and freedom of the will is 
neglected.  In any case, since groups always lurk behind cultures, we are bound by theoretical 
honesty to enquire what these groups are, how they are formed, and how these ideas relate to the 
groups or units that hold them. 
Again according to Boon and Schneider, ‘in myth, man’s analogical capacity … is 
portrayed as being dependent on its materials only insofar as it must have something … to work 
with….  [Similarly] we might relax our preconceptions as to the genealogical and social 
organizational nature of ‘kinship’ data as well (Boon and Schneider 1974: 815). The 
dependence on previous interpretation in order to recognise the occurrence of myth or kinship, 
and the dependence for that on triangulation with others and the world, are simply taken for 
granted, as if they were matters of small concern.  Man’s materiality is taken to be secondary to 
his ideas – merely the wall on which the cultural shadows are reflected.  This is as extreme a 
form of idealism as anthropology will ever manage.10 The hegemonic position that 
Schneiderian idealism has assumed in global anthropology over the past two decades is surely 
one of today’s principal theoretical hurdles.  It does not help us to ease any of the perplexities 
caused by sociocentrism, neither those concerning ‘group-ness’ nor those concerning 
‘representation’.  As Davidson warned, ‘the notion that our will is free from physical 
determination has prompted many to hold that the mental and the physical must be discrete 
realms, but if they are somehow decoupled, it is a question of how knowledge is possible.  
Skepticism and the problem of free will are symmetrical problems’ (Davidson 2005: 277). 
 In fact, the antinomy between freedom of the will and determination only becomes 
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troublesome to the extent that we avoid it.  Anthropologists ought boldly to address the issue 
and develop ways of mediating it.  Humans are subject to determination both to the extent that 
they live in a material world and to the extent that they are constituted by a human environment 
where rationality and language operate.  The latter institute new forms of causality, new ‘needs’; 
the two forms of determination converge.  This is what Davidson calls the anomaly in our 
ontological monism: there is only one world, but rationality sets in motion new styles of 
causality within that world.11  This means that all human action is confronted both by its 
‘underdetermination’ (e.g., ibid.: 318) and by its ‘unpredictability’ (see Arendt 1958: 233). 
That is, we are incapable of determining not only the causes of our actions, but also what their 
impact will be on the world.  Again, in Gil’s formulation, ‘the unpredictability resides less in 
the mere intersection of causal series than in the simultaneity of occurrences in the particular 
here and the particular now’ (Gil 2004: 5).  Hazard accompanies our every move. 
 Thus, the fourth condition highlighted here is that, when considering human thought 
and action (that is, when interpreting the actions of humans in the world), the anthropologist 
should be satisfied neither by talk of random choice nor by talk of absolute necessity.  We 
cannot settle either for a Sartrean notion of freedom or for a Malinowskian notion of need.  
Freedom and necessity do exist in the human condition but, due to the anomaly in our monism, 
they have to be seen as mediated. We must avoid anthropological determinism, whether this be 
positivistic or, as is the case with the example presented above of Boon and Schneider, idealist 
in character. 
 If human action is underdetermined and unpredictable, any unmediated notion of 
necessity is invalid.  But the idea of necessity has a number of distinct implications (see Gil 
2004) depending whether it is seen as opposed to what is possible (i.e., capable of happening), 
to what is contingent (i.e., determined by circumstances not yet established), to what is free (i.e., 
unconstrained), or to what is indeterminate (i.e., not capable of being determined as, for 
instance, in the above example of simultaneity). Theorising the determinations of human action 
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in a world characterised by anomalous monism requires a search for a mediation to these 
antinomies.   
Thus, we observe occurrences that are not merely possible but probable; not merely 
contingent but frequent; not merely free but relatively unconstrained; not merely indeterminate 
but spontaneous.  When these four conditions meet, we are faced with observations that have a 
high level of generality and a special relevance for the study of the human condition. 
 Anthropology has long silenced the discussion of universals of the human condition.   
When the topic surfaces, it is usually met with dystopian derision.  The reason for this is that, 
despite some useful insights by Needham (1981: 20–24) concerning ‘primary factors’,12 most 
anthropologists have understood ‘universals’ in terms of ‘needs’.  It has been thought that if 
something were to be a universal then it would have to be observable always and permanently 
in all historically known instances of human sociation.  This, however, is a mistake, since it 
implies that phenomena of human thought and action are subject to the same type of causality 
that characterises inert substances.  The anomaly in our world means that no such causation will 
ever be found in matters of human thought and action.   
A universal of the human condition, therefore, can usefully be redefined to cover what 
Needham (1978) called ‘proclivities’ – that is, dispositions of thought and action that are 
probable, frequent, spontaneous, and for which there seems to be an inclination. Through this 
‘door in the middle’ we can search for instruments of interpretation that do not imply an 
abandoning of generalisation.  In many ways, this position is not only akin to Adam Kuper’s 
advocacy of a universalist viewpoint but also very similar to that espoused by Maurice Bloch in 
his recent essay on seeing and lying, where he argues that ‘we might attempt to generalize about 
a phenomenon such as the recurrence of the association between truth and sight without 
ignoring important anti-universalist points’ (Bloch 2008: 22). 
 
Alterity and System 
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Modernist sociocentrism relies on a contrastive notion of alterity that sees it as a relation 
between two or more entities that stand apart from each other.  Societies and cultures, as much 
as individuals, are assumed to be closed upon themselves and oppositionally related.  This kind 
of sociological monism, however, is unwarranted. Alterity and identity in human affairs are not 
symmetrical (Levinas 1996; cf. Pina-Cabral 2005b).  Alterity both creates identity – in the 
ethical face-to-face relation that constitutes persons ontogenetically – and reflects it.  Social 
entities (persons or collectives) are not elemental units, for they are mutually constituted.  
Similarly, ‘mental categories’ are also not subject to treatment as things or pictures, due to the 
ultimate indeterminacy of interpretation (Davidson 2005: 316). 
Thus, for example, to accuse anthropology of focusing on continuity to the exclusion of 
change (Robbins 2007) does not really address the issue, since it focuses exclusively upon only 
half of it.  There have, indeed, been many anthropologists over the past decades who have 
focused on change at the expense of continuity, but that did not solve the problem.  
Anthropologists lack a socio-cultural language for dealing with change. But we also lack a 
language to describe long-term fixity and continuity in anything other than a unitary manner 
(Pina-Cabral 1992).  The problem has to do both with schism and continuity, to quote Victor 
Turner’s famous title (Turner 1957).  The basis of the problem is that the emphasis on sameness 
has prevented a more complex understanding of alterity.13 We must abandon the notion that 
societies and cultures (and the groups that hold them) are things to the extent that they are 
identical with themselves.  Identity is produced by alterity and, thus, it is always preceded by it.  
Embracing processualism will not, in itself, resolve the problem if one remains trapped 
by a sociocentric concern with unitariness.  Instead of seeing social entities as enclosed units, 
we must understand that they are the result of continual processes of identification.  No identity 
is ever fully accomplished, as identity is a momentary crystallisation of the processes of 
identification and differentiation that are constantly going on in human settings.  Identity is not 
a ‘picture in the mind’; rather, it is the historically specific observable effect of these processes. 
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Being the sediment of history, identity is constantly challenged by it – that is, by the 
continuation of the very same processes that produce it.  This must prompt us to give up our 
unitarian concept of identity. Modernist thinking tended to see the unitariness of groups and 
societies as equivalent to that of individuals.  Thus, sociocentrism and individualism usually 
converged: in Fortes’s work on kinship this is explicitly elaborated in the notion of the ‘juristic 
person’ (Fortes 1969: 301).  Calling our attention to this, Marilyn Strathern claims that ‘in 
anthropological discourse, systems, like conventions or like societies and cultures, were 
frequently personified as agents with interests of their own – an image laminated in the picture 
of corporate groups as juristic persons’ (Strathern 1992b: 97).  However accurate, this 
formulation raises further problems, since it presupposes that all agency must be limited to 
individuals, to physical persons, and hence that no suprapersonal entity can be attributed with it.  
This presupposition is not only empirically erroneous but theoretically disturbing, as it suggests 
a re-entry of individualism by the back door.  As de Coppet (1992) warned, it presumes the 
greater unitariness of the person as a level of social identity.14 
The presumption of unitariness has implications for our daily activities as 
anthropologists and ethnographers.  Our main instrument of analysis is the search for system in 
empirical fields that we have delineated on the basis of earlier analyses.  The notion that the 
ethnographer’s task is one of interpretation is yet another instance of a half-truth that, through a 
fallacy of all-or-nothing, is taken to represent the whole (Pina-Cabral 2007b).  Interpretation is 
merely the beginning of an ethnographer’s task, as they have to place the interpretations they 
gather into some sort of analytically relevant whole.  The relevance of such a whole will not 
emerge from everyday interchange or be limited to the ethnographic present, but rather builds 
upon the history of anthropology. 
When we look for patterns, correlations, or correspondences, we are in fact looking for 
system within fields that we, or our predecessors, previously outlined. Anthropology is familiar 
with such pursuits, and has made its greatest achievements precisely when carrying out this 
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type of exercise.  Major discoveries – such as that of the existence of classificatory systems of 
kinship, of rites of passage, of segmentariness, or of matrimonial strategies – have depended on 
the postulation of system and on the identification of forms of structural causality and structural 
transformation. 
One of the conditions for the continuation of anthropological thought is to accept certain 
lessons from our predecessors regarding how systemic analysis yields insights into how we 
humans live in our environing world.   In doing so, unitariness should not be granted to 
socio-cultural entities; entity status should not be given to ‘ideas’; and structures should not be 
viewed as complete and self-regulating.  The structuralism of the 1960s and 1970s is no longer 
a possibility, and removing it to the realm of ideas, as Boon and Schneider (1974) would have it, 
is unhelpful.  Once more, a mediation or ‘door in the middle’ will allow us to profit from 
anthropology’s accumulated methodological legacy, and to arrive at a mitigated structuralism. 
If, as Gil claims,‘to be able to conceive a mobile order is the ambition of all great 
philosophy’ (Gil 2004: 17), it should also be the ambition of anthropology. Following a 
suggestion laid out by Musil (1995), Gil defines ‘mobile order’ by reference to three great 
aporias – or contradictions – of human action: power and limitation, arbitrariness and law, 
freedom and measure.  These may not be easily resolvable, but if engaged with boldly they will 
allow for an acceptance of the open-ended and incomplete character of anthropological enquiry.  
They will enable the realization that domination, though it is a founding element of human 
thought and action, will never be absolute; that normativeness, although a permanent feature of 
social life, will never be fully enforceable; and that freedom is matched by measure at all levels. 
Human imagination is free, creativity exists, but always within the bounds established by the 
fact that persons and collectives have been historically constituted.  
 
Affects 
Finally, anthropologists must come to terms with the fact that humans cannot leave their skins.  
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Our human condition is the ethical base of our scientific thinking.  All forms of thinking are 
both in the world and human, that is they are ethically geared to action.   
This focus on ethics – and, consequently, on affect – is in sharp contrast to prevalent 
modernist sociocentric attitudes, which have encouraged one to see the relation between social 
entities as one of conflict – either between units or between independent partners. They do not 
focus on the limits of interest but presume interest to be incumbent upon elemental units 
(persons or collectives) and, thus, univocally determinable.15  The result is a cynical model of 
social existence which is essentially conflictual, and of unequal power as a form of violence, in 
which there is a constraining of the interest of someone by someone else.  The particular version 
of this that has become hegemonic in anthropology over the past decades is largely due to the 
vulgarisation of Michel Foucault’s so-called ‘Nietzsche’s hypothesis’ (Foucault 1977; cf. 
Hoffman 2007: 757). This amounts to the notion that ‘the history that bears and determines us 
has the form of a war rather than that of a language – relations of power, not relations of 
meaning’ (in Chomsky and Foucault 2006 [1971]: 147).   
Since the publication of Foucault’s final lectures at the Collège de France, however, it 
has become possible to trace the evolution of his thought during the late 1970s. Foucault’s 
formulation of Nietzsche’s hypothesis arose from his direct and active engagement in politics, 
particularly the politics of race (Hoffman 2007).  As the latter evolved, Foucault started to 
understand that ‘the discourse of race war which had served as the harbinger of his own 
thinking about power [was being] transformed into an integral, biologically driven “state 
racism”.’ (ibid.: 758) Thus, finally, he came to ask himself, ‘can war really provide a valid 
analysis of power relations, and can it act as a matrix for techniques of domination?’ (Foucault 
2003: 46). 
The concern of Foucault’s more mature years was to query this overt and warlike 
domination. In this way he approaches Emmanuel Levinas’s concern that ‘it is by no means 
certain that, at the beginning, there was war’ (in Finkielkraut 1997: 12).  This is an area of 
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anthropological thinking which requires further theoretical elaboration since, as Foucault 
discovered, this kind of formulation often turns out to be the harbinger of the very processes 
that it aims to critique (see also Fry 2005).  Rather, once we question the modernist sociocentric 
mould, we are faced with a totally new picture of the relationship between power and sociality.  
Inequalities of power must be identified with war, and domination seen as brutal violence, only 
if identity is seen as symmetrical with alterity.  But such a perception is challenged if we 
recognize that ‘Human experience is social before it is rational’ (Finkielkraut 1997:10).  The 
roots of domination are present at the very moment of the constitution of the person.  The first 
person never existed; all people were created by other people.  The very possibility of 
understanding depends on sociality as much as sociality depends on understanding – and, at the 
root of it all, on the learning of a human language.16 
Wittgenstein’s enigmatic comment that ‘meaning something is like going up to 
someone’ (quoted in Davidson 2001: 107) thus makes more sense.  We see more clearly now 
the origin of Boon and Schneider’s (1974) error: they wanted to separate meaning from 
sociality; ideas from persons.  But persons are constituted by meaning and meaning can only 
exist in the ‘surrounding’ world: ‘The basic situation is one that involves two or more creatures 
simultaneously in interaction with each other and with the world they share’ (Davidson 2001: 
128).  Communication requires that a person must agree to follow the paths that they perceive 
others to be tracing (ibid.: 114).17 If anthropologists are to escape the trap laid out by modernist 
sociocentric conceptions of social entities, and of meaning as representation, they have to start 
working empirically, that is ethnographically, with the notion that at the root of all sociality lies 
not conflict/war but docility/negotiation. This can also be called ‘charity’ (Quine 1969: 46; 
Davidson 2005: 211), ‘coresponsibility’ or ‘fraternity’ (Levinas 1996; Finkielkraut 1997).  
Ethnography would not be possible if we did not recognise humanity in others and if we and 
they were not essentially, fundamentally, formatively docile.  This may be why ethnographers 
are so keen to call their subjects of study ‘friends’: such a term may be a euphemism, and 
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paternalistic, but at the root of it lies a real sense of empathy based on a shared feeling of 
coresponsibility, an ethical relation of co-constitution. 
When I call on docility as the root of sociality, the reader might be led to think that I 
have stopped watching the news on television.  Not at all.  It is not necessary to forget the 
horrors, the betrayals, the heartlessness, to come to terms with the fact that domination does not 
arise between social entities violently. Rather, that which allows for the constitution of social 
entities can later turn to violence (Finkielkraut 1997). 
To persist – dystopically – in finding solutions that rely on sociocentrism and on a 
semiotic theory of representation, is to make it more difficult to understand social relations.  
Instead, it is at the level of affects (ethical dispositions, not to be confused with morals) that the 
meaning of such relations must be sought. This will allow a reconstruction of the conditions of 
possibility of anthropological analysis and of ethnographic enquiry. 
 
The Door in the Middle 
By using the phrase ‘the door in the middle’ I aim to capture the spirit of the six conditions 
outlined above. Seen together, they represent an argument in favour of a new form of classicism, 
a new engagement with the historicity of anthropological knowledge. Such an engagement is 
opposed to the modernist model of knowledge construction as being based on leaps towards 
new ‘paradigms’, a model which Martins (1974) calls caesurism .  Curiously, most authors that 
left their marks on anthropological theory in the 1990s and the early twenty-first century, whilst 
being explicitly post- or non-modernist, continue to conceive of their activity as producers of 
anthropology in vanguardist modes.  The procedure involved is the following: firstly, to 
postulate a break in understanding at a certain moment in history, corresponding to some sort of 
new theoretical insight marked by a master – be they Marx, Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Foucault, 
Schneider, or Deleuze – and then, secondly, to cast into irrelevance all that went before thus 
claiming to open a whole new era.   
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This procedure typifies and catalogues, in a linear process of overcoming, the various 
modes of carrying out anthropology as if they were unitary and indivisible, as if they were 
‘prototypes’ or episthèmes.  Thus, it produces ahistorical critical objects that, much as they may 
be useful for the teaching of undergraduates, are difficult to identify with any intellectual 
honesty: ‘structural-functionalism’, ‘1980s relativism’, ‘classical kinship theory’, and so on.  
My argument, to the contrary, is anti-caesurist (Pina Cabral 1992, 2007a): it denies that there 
can ever be any decisive break, any paradigmatic shift, any radical theoretical caesura in the 
thinking of social scientists.   
The pretension that such breaks can exist is often self-interested and derives from a type 
of academic anxiety of influence mixed with a desire not to consider the arguments of ‘old 
timers’.  For example, if all that went before Schneider’s critique of kinship (Schneider 1984) 
becomes ‘classical kinship theory’, or all that went before ‘postcolonial studies’ is ‘colonialist 
anthropology’, these bodies of knowledge can be safely ignored.  But if, instead of claiming 
decisive breakthroughs, it became possible to build upon anthropology’s established claims, 
then the ‘door in the middle’ would be our way.  This would make it possible:  
(1) to assume a position of minimal realism,  
(2) to work with a notion of limited interest in the study of human action,  
(3) to capture the process of triangulation in the constitution of meaning,  
(4) to open once again the debate concerning universals by a more complex approach to 
the issue of determination,  
(5) to re-engage creatively with systemic analysis through a mitigated structuralism, and  
(6) to approach a theory of relations of domination that avoided the pitfalls of the notion 
of power as violence.  In this way, we might be able to bring to fruition in our empirical 
research (both ethnographic and comparative) the profound critical discoveries that have 
characterised anthropology since the late 1950s without being imprisoned by its sociocentrism.   
I propose that we should stop looking at the future, in a utopian way, as if it was 
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incommensurable with the past. We should embrace the historicity of social knowledge not as a 
condition but a desideratum.  Following Merleau-Ponty’s injunction quoted above – and much 
like Quine when he formulated the notion of the indeterminacy of translation – we must realise 
that the historicity of knowledge is not a limitation; rather, it is the very ground of the 
possibility of social anthropology.   
Adam Kuper’s lifelong engagement both with our heritage from the past and with our 
active contemporary debates is, to my eyes, one of the best models that we could follow for a 
truly creative practice of our discipline. 
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Notes 
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a seminar on ‘Anthropology, Now and Next’, 
organised by Christina Garten and Helena Wulff  in honour of Ulf Hannerz, at the University of 
Stockholm, September 2007.  I am grateful to all the participants for a fascinating debate. Later, 
I also gained considerably from the symposium ‘An Epistemology for Anthropology’ 
(sponsored by the Wenner-Gren Foundation and the Institute of Social Sciences, Lisbon, and 
held in September 2007). I am indebted to critical comments by Peter Gow, Dominique Boyer, 
Luis Vasconcelos and Catarina Frois. Christina Toren’s intellectual friendship has been a 
special privilege. 
2. This debate was between Marilyn Strathern and Christina Toren, who supported the motion, 
and J.D.Y. Peel and Jonathan Spencer, who rejected it whilst agreeing to the relevance of the 
topic: see Ingold (1996: 55–98). 
3. In the face of the author’s prudent conclusions, the anger with which this book has met is to 
me a clear sign of how academics are more afraid of what threatens their jobs than what 
threatens their ideas. 
4. Source: 
http://www.ppgasmuseu.etc.br/museu/texto/Curso-2006-1_EVC-MG_MNA-806.doc. 
5.  See Hermínio Martins’s classical criticism of ‘caesurism’ as a theoretical disposition 
(Martins 1974). 
6. This represents a qualifier to the perspectival identification of ‘anthropology’ with 
‘Euro-American’ that has characterised Marilyn Strathern’s Schneiderian turn in the 1990s (see 
Strathern 1992a: 98). 
7. See Hannerz (1992, 2004). However, I see this concept first as an instance of sociation rather 
than merely in terms of ‘culture’, thus diverging from Hannerz’s ‘ongoing effort to explore 
what social anthropology can credibly contribute to the understanding of global or transnational 
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cultural processes’ (Hannerz 1992: 34; cf. 2004). Second, these processes are rooted in the 
history of the modern era (Mintz 1994) rather than being limited to the twentieth century. 
8. Viveiros de Castro points to something similar: ‘the old postulate of the ontological 
discontinuity between sign and referent, language and the world, which guaranteed the reality 
of the former and the intelligibility of the latter and vice versa (and which served as the 
foundation and pretext for so many other discontinuities and exclusions – between myth and 
philosophy, magic and science, primitives and civilized – appears to be in the process of 
becoming metaphysically obsolete; this is the way in which we are stopping to be, or better, are 
stopping to ever-having-been modern’ (2007:95). See also Gudeman (this volume). 
9. In the case of anthropology, the most important influence is probably Durkheim’s 
dependence on a French style of academic Kantianism. 
10. Perhaps this is why Lévi-Strauss (1984, 1988) never took their advice in the matter of 
kinship studies. 
11. In this matter, Davidson follows both Aristotle and Spinoza in arguing that ‘there is only 
one substance [but] the mental and the physical are irreducibly different modes of apprehending, 
describing and explaining what happens in nature’.  Thus, together with these philosophers of 
the past, he sustains ‘the conceptual irreducibility of the mental to the physical’ (Davidson 2005: 
290).   
12. Needham’s belief that these ‘elementary forms of thought and action’ are direct responses 
to ‘properties of the cerebral cortex’ (Needham 1981: 25) was ultimately unuseful. 
13. This might be another way of seeing Hanna Arendt’s argument that modernity has 
witnessed the triumph of the notion of ‘sameness’ (Finkielkraut 1997: 103). 
14. This would explicitly go against Strathern’s treatment of the Garia person in the same paper 
(e.g., 1992b: 101, n.13). 
15. This is one of the reasons why the concept of ‘interest’ was treated with suspicion (see 
Mauss 1950: 271). 
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16. The requirement of having learnt a language in order to be able to think does not mean that 
communication demands the sharing of a natural language (Davidson 2005: 89–108). 
17. This has been corroborated by the recent identification of the neurophysiological 
mechanisms underlying the understanding and imitation of action, António Damásio’s 
‘as-if-body loop’ (2003: 125–6). 
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